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This paper investigates the effects of corporate governance mechanisms on the cost of capital 
of Canadian firms listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange after the 2008 financial crisis. Since 
the end of the crisis, the cost of capital has fallen for Canadian firms. Insider ownership, 
board size, and CEO duality are found to be negatively related to the cost of capital. In 
contrast, institutional ownership is shown to be positively related to the cost of capital. Most 
examined governance mechanisms have differential impacts on firms across industries and 
regions in Canada. In Canadian mining firms, which have a higher cost of capital than firms 
in other industries, insider ownership is negatively associated with the cost of capital. In the 
transportation industry, both institutional ownership and insider ownership are positively 
related to the cost of capital. Firms domiciled in Quebec have a lower cost of capital that 
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After the 2008 financial crisis, policy makers in the G-7 agreed to take whatever steps were 
required to stimulate the global economy. They lowered interest rates sharply in a 
coordinated manner, in order to stimulate spending of consumers and firm investments. The 
latter are closely linked to the firms’ cost of capital. It is clear how lower interest rates can be 
directly linked to firms’ cost of capital through the cost of debt. How the overall cost of 
capital is affected in part depends on other factors, including firm governance. While several 
studies have appeared that look at the impact of governance on equity prices,1 only a few 
have examined the links between governance and the overall cost of capital. Suchard et al., 
(2012) look at the Australian markets. Core et al., (2015) examine the US markets. Most 
studies examine the interaction of governance index and the firm value which is measured by 
Tobin’Q in Canadian markets focusing on the post Enron period2. As Klein, Shapiro, and 
Young (2005) note, effective compensation, disclosure, and shareholder rights practices 
increase firms’ performance. Gupta et al., (2009) do not find a consistently strong association 
between firm value and overall governance score in Canadian markets. There is no 
overwhelming evidence to suggest that within Canadian capital markets firm value is 
enhanced by better governance. Bozec and Bozec (2010) find that Canadian firms with higher 
governance scores from the Globe and Mail’s Report on Business (ROB) index have lower 
weighted average cost of capital (WACC) estimates after the Enron Scandal. We are unaware 
of any research pertaining to the impact of particular governance mechanisms on the cost of 
capital in Canadian market after the 2008 financial crisis. 
 
The purpose of this study is to fill this gap. This paper investigates the impacts of firm-level 
governance mechanisms on the cost of capital in the Canadian market. Similar to Suchard et 
al., (2012), the study uses the firms’ weighted average cost of capital (WACC) as a measure 
                                                             
1 See e.g. Gompers et al. (2003), Cremers and Nair (2005), Switzer and Kelly (2006), Switzer (2007), Bebchuk et al. (2009) 
and Giroud and Mueller (2011). 




of the firm’s cost of capital. The WACC separates the total capital into common equity, 
preferred equity, long-term debt, and short-term debt. The weights of each financing resource 
are calculated by dividing each amount by total capital. The weighted average cost of capital 
is meaningful to firms. The cost of capital reflects the minimum required rate of return on a 
project in order to make it worthwhile. It also provide the necessary return to the providers of 
capital, which is based on the risk of the firm’s current operations. Management must 
efficiently allocate capital within the company to meet the WACC. If the WACC is set too 
high, the firm has to reject valuable opportunities leading to demolishing shareholder value. 
Strong governance practice can lower the WACC by reducing monitoring costs through 
aligned interests between top management and shareholders. A sample of 121 Canadian firms 
listed on Toronto Stock Exchange from 2010 to 2014 is used to analyze the relationship 
between the cost of capital and corporate governance controlling for the differences in 
industry and region. The results are robust to the effects of heteroscedasticity and truncated 
estimation effects, as well as for firm fixed-effects to account for any unobserved firm 
heterogeneity.  
 
Five variables are considered as governance mechanisms: institutional ownership, insider 
ownership, board independence, board size, and CEO duality. Both insider ownership and 
board size are found to be significantly and negatively related to the contemporaneous cost of 
capital. In contrast, institutional ownership and CEO Duality are positively and significantly 
related to firms’ cost of capital. Finally, the degree of independence of the board directors is 
not significantly related to the cost of capital. These results hold both when the governance 
mechanisms are measured contemporaneously with the firm’s cost of capital as well as when 
they are measured with a one year lag. The study also looks at differential effects of 
governance mechanisms across industries and regions in Canadian. The cost of capital is 
much higher in both mining and manufacturing firms compared to firms in the transport 
sector. In the mining industry, more insider ownership and CEO duality are inversely related 
to firms’ cost of capital. In the manufacturing sector, firm characteristics and insider 




size, insider ownership, and director independence are positively related to the cost of capital. 
Institutional ownership has a positive impact on the cost of capital only in transportation 
firms. Finally, Canadian firms headquartered in Quebec have lower costs of capital compared 
with firms headquartered in other areas. This may be explained by variations in industrial 
structure across regions. For example, the majority firms in Quebec are from manufacturing, 
transportation, and retail industries. In contrast, in Western Canada, more than half of the 
firms in the sample are from mining industry. As firms in the mining industry have high level 
of the cost of capital, firms in Quebec and Ontario areas have relatively lower cost of capital. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature; 
Section 3 presents the hypotheses; Section 4 presents information regarding the data and 
sample selection; Section 5 presents methodology and empirical results and Section 6 
concludes the paper. 
2. Literature Review 
2.1 Previous studies on firm performance and corporate governance 
Previous studies have shown significant links between the quality of the firm’s corporate 
governance and the value of the firm. Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2001) and Bebchuk, 
Cohen, and Ferrell (2009) focus on how the shareholder rights influence the firm 
performance. They construct an index measuring the level of shareholder rights at companies, 
which is “GIM Governance Index”. They suggest that firms with better protection on 
shareholder rights have higher firm value, higher profits, higher sales growth, lower capital 
expenditures, and involved with fewer corporate acquisitions. Their proxies for shareholder 
rights include defensive tactics, voting rights and director protections. Bhagat and Bolton 
(2008) suggest that governance capabilities are significantly positive correlated with 
contemporaneous and subsequent operating performance as measured by the “GIM” index. 
Bebchuck, Cohen and Ferrell (2009) study which governance provisions in particular 




provisions (staggered boards, limits to shareholder bylaw amendments, poison pills, golden 
parachutes, and supermajority requirements for mergers and charter amendments) that are 
negatively correlated with firm valuation. They find that increases in the index are associated 
with significant reductions on firm valuation and the entrenching provisions bring about 
lower firm valuation. 
 
Empirical work distinguishes between these factors, called “external governance” 
mechanisms, and other factors called “internal governance” mechanisms, such as the 
percentage of independent directors, the CEO duality, and the ownership. For example, 
Agrawal et al., (1996) examine seven governance mechanisms (including insider ownership, 
instructions, blockholders, outside directors, debt policy, managerial labor market, and the 
market for corporate control) effects on solving agency problem between shareholders and 
managers. They find great insider ownership is positively related to performance, while more 
outsiders on the board are negatively related to performance. Cho (1998) also find that insider 
ownership is quite important among these mechanisms since other governance mechanisms 
are significant only when insider ownership exists. Suchard et al., (2012) find that greater 
insider ownership can reduce the perceived risk of a firm, thereby reduce required return of 
investors. However, Dements and Villalonga (2001) find no statistically significant relation 
between ownership structure and firm performance. Himmelberg et al., (1999) hold that 
insider ownership can reduce information asymmetry but also can force the insiders to avoid 
high idiosyncratic risk and result in underinvestment and higher cost of capital. 
 
Institutional investors play an important role in financial market since their preference and 
decisions will affect the firm’s governance quality. Institutional investors can mitigate agency 
problem through outside monitoring and information asymmetry. Firms have greater 
institutional ownership usually have higher rating because institutional investors would be 
willing to pay more premium to firms with good governance. (e.g., Chen et al., 2009; 
McCahery et al., 2011). Institutional investors also alleviate market imperfections, thereby 




with more institutional ownership have a lower cost of debt because institutional investors 
enhance the monitoring on the management. However, the relationship between institutional 
ownership and the cost of capital is not always negative. Concentrated institutional ownership 
can adversely affect firm bond’s yields and ratings resulting in higher overall cost of capital 
(Bhojraj and Sengupta 2003).  
 
In U.S. both the NYSE and NASDAQ stock exchange s require that a majority of the board 
of directors of a listed company be independent. Independent boards are considered as an 
efficient way to mitigate the agency problem. Bhagat and Black (2000) find a strong 
correlation between firm’s poor performance and a subsequent increase in board 
independence. The existing literature also addresses a link between board independence and 
CEO compensation. The rationale is that CEOs at firms with weak governance have less 
monitoring and constraints thus receive higher compensation. Moreover, these firms have 
worse subsequent operation performance in the future (Core et al., 1999). Several studies also 
investigate the relationship between board size and firm performance. A negative correlation 
is shown for U.S. firms and Finnish firms (Eisenberg and Wells, 1998). An inverse relation 
between board size and firm value is are found in Singapore and Malaysia suggesting that 
small boards are better (Mak and Kusnadi. 2004). However, for firms that have large boards, 
taking more compromises to reach consensus will lead to stable performance indicated by 
stock returns and expenditures (Cheng, 2008).  
 
Only a few studies have looked at the relationship between corporate governance and 
performance in Canada. Based on the extant studies, there is no overwhelming evidence to 
suggest that Canadian firm performance is enhanced by better governance using “good 
governance” indexes. Klein et al., (2005) conclude that corporate governance is relevant to 
shareholder value in Canada but certain governance mechanisms are more important than 
others. They find that effective compensation, disclosure, and shareholder rights practices 
increase firms’ performance regardless of their ownership. In particular, they find that the 




Gupta et al., (2009) does not find a consistently strong association between the firm value and 
overall governance score which is measured by Report on Business (“ROB”) index in 
Canadian markets. It is possible that the ROB governance scores do not adequately capture 
the true state of overall corporate governance. They suggest that the “ROB” governance 
index is not the best measure of effective governance within Canadian capital markets. 
Switzer and Kelly (2006) and Switzer (2007) focus on Canadian small cap firms, and find a 
significantly negative relationship between debt and firm value based on Tobin’s Q.  
2.2 Previous studies on firm performance in different governance systems 
Some studies examine factors in a firm’s environment that strengthen (or weaken) the link 
between good governance and firm value. Governance system can differ through 
multi-industries based on the competitive level. Market competition can function as an 
external mechanism for disciplining management. Giroud and Mueller (2010) examine how 
corporate governance is related to firm performance based on the competition level. 
Corporate governance in competitive industries has relatively weak influence on firms due to 
mitigating management entrenchment. However, there is no direct link between competition 
level and corporate governance. Subsequently, they find that firms with weak governance 
have lower labor productivity, higher input costs, and make more value-destroying 
acquisitions only in noncompetitive industries. Chou et al., (2011) suggest that corporate 
governance quality has a significant effect on performance only when product market 
competition is relatively weak. Ammann et al., (2013) confirm that competition in the product 
market is a substitute for corporate governance by imposing pressure on managers to 
maximize firm value.  
 
Average firm level governance is lower in emerging countries with weaker legal systems. 
Governance is correlated with the extent of the asymmetric information. Firm level corporate 
governance provisions matter more in countries with weak legal environments. Better 
corporate governance is highly correlated with better operating performance and market 




2.3 Previous studies on the effects of governance on the cost of capital  
The cost of equity depends on both firm specific risk and systematic risk. For example, Li et 
al. (2013) test the relationship between cost of equity and corporate governance during 
different economic conditions: boom periods, normal periods, and bust periods. They find 
that well-governed firms have higher expected stock returns during booms but lower stock 
expected return during busts. They thus predict that there is a pro-cyclical relation between 
corporate governance and stock returns. Firms with better governance pose a smaller agency 
risk to shareholders, which reduces their cost of equity (Ashbaugh et al., 2006). Cremers and 
Nair (2005) suggest that internal and external governance mechanisms are strong 
complements in being associated with long-term abnormal returns and profitability. They 
further conclude that corporate governance is stronger when internal governance is also 
considered. 
 
Similar to the cost of equity, the cost of debt depends on investor protection provisions. In 
general, antitakeover governance provisions are viewed favorably in the bond market. 
Antitakeover governance provisions can lower the cost of debt, as shown in Klock et al. 
(2005). Cremers et al. (2007) investigate the impact of shareholder governance mechanisms 
on bondholders. They suggest that stronger shareholder control is associated with higher 
bond yields, lower ratings, and higher returns only if takeover vulnerability is high. Bond 
covenants help align the interest of shareholders and bondholders. Second, firms with high 
disclosure ratings can obtain lower effective interest rates on their debt financing. Investors 
rely more on corporate disclosures in debt markets when stock market uncertainty is high 
(Sengupta 1998). Furthermore, the relationship between corporate governance capability and 
the cost of debt is stronger in countries with weak legal protection, low transparency, and 
poor government quality. The differential relationship can be attributed to asymmetric payoffs 
received by creditors and shareholders (Zhu 2014).  
 




measured by a weighted average of terms that reflect both idiosyncratic and systematic risk. 
Weaker investor protection leads to higher potential abuse of ordinary shareholders by 
insiders. The discrete relationship between the ownership and control allows managers who 
control the firm’s investment policy to seek private benefits and tend to overinvest. However, 
Core et al., (2015) show that both insider ownership and more transparent reporting have the 
potential to align incentives between managers and investors thereby reducing systematic risk. 
Suchard et al., (2012) find similar results for Australian firms. Greater insider ownership, the 
presence of institutional blockholders, and independent boards all serve to reduce the 
perceived risk of a firm, thereby leading investors to demand lower the rates of return on 
capital provided. Bozec and Bozec (2010) investigate the relationship between the weighted 
average cost of capital and overall corporate governance which is measured by ROB 
governance index. They find strong evidence that the cost of capital decreases as the quality 
of corporate governance practices increases. Canadian firms with higher ROB scores have 
lower WACC. Differences in the composition of information between public and private 
information could also affect the cost of capital. Investors expect a higher return on stocks 
with more private information (Easley et al., 2004). 
3. Hypothesis  
This section introduces several hypotheses about the relationship between the cost of capital 
and corporate governance mechanisms in Canadian firms, focusing on five important 
governance mechanisms: board size, board independence, separation between CEO and 
Chairman, institutional ownership, insider ownership. The hypotheses to be tested are as 
follows: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Insider ownership is negatively related to the cost of capital. 
Greater insider ownership is expected to reduce the perceived risk of a firm, thereby reducing 
the required return of investors. Core et al. (2015) note that insider ownership can indirectly 




outside shareholders, which represents a fixed cost of firm. The agency cost of capital could 
be mitigated by increasing managerial ownership which causes managers to bear the wealth 
consequences of their actions. When insider ownership in the firm serves to align interests of 
management and stakeholders, managers can only invest subject to constraints based on 
personal wealth and diversification considerations. As managers’ compensation depends on 
the firm performance, they may tend to adopt strategies that can reduce firm risk. In this case, 
lower perceived risk leads to lower investors’ required return. 
 
Moreover, according to the pecking order theory, managers would prefer internal financing 
than external financing because external financing may represent a negative signal to 
investors. After the subprime financial crisis, the cost of debt from bank fell sharply in 
Canada. This can also induce managers to choose debt financing rather than equity financing, 
which will also lower the overall cost of capital. Thus, one would expect that the cost of 
capital should be negatively related to insider holdings.  
 
Hypothesis 2: The impact of institutional ownership on the cost of capital is positive. 
McConnell and Servaes (1995) find a positive relationship between institutional ownership 
and firm performance. However, the impact of institutional investment on firm performance 
remains an open question in the literature.3Institutional investors are important among all 
governance mechanisms since they have voting rights on firm decision making. On the one 
hand, they provide independent monitoring of management which will promote effective 
managerial decision making and guard against opportunistic management behaviors that 
decrease firm value. Better managerial decision making and limited opportunistic 
management behavior can benefit all stakeholders.  
 
However, as suggested by Lev et al., (2003), firm investment has a positive relationship with 
                                                             
3 See e.g. Shleifer and Vishny, 1986, Porter, 1992, Maug, 1998, Gillan and Starks, 2000, Yu, 2005, Chen, Harford, and Li, 




the level of institutional ownership. The direct effect of institutional ownership on investment 
is that institutional ownership mitigates firm underinvestment. More investment activities 
will increase the cost of capital. In this case, a positive relation between institutional 
ownership and the cost of capital should be observed. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Board size is negatively related to the cost of capital. 
One important role of corporate boards is to assure the quality and integrity of information. A 
transparent information environment can effectively reduce the cost of capital. Larger boards 
facilitate proper allocation of responsibilities through board committees and reduce 
information asymmetry between insiders and outside investors. Although smaller boards 
might provide more effective monitoring services, investors perceive larger boards as 
providing a more transparent information environment, which leads to a lower cost of 
capital.4 For this reason, large boards could reduce the cost of capital because it can provide 
a more transparent information environment. Therefore, we hypothesize a negative 
relationship between board size and the cost of capital.  
  
Hypothesis 4: Board independence is negatively related to the cost of capital. 
Independent board structure is considered as an efficient way to mitigate the agency issue 
which is the separation of firm control and ownership. Independent directors generally 
perform a better monitoring role and most studies document a negative association between 
board independence and the cost of capital.5 A higher percentage of independent directors on 
board can reduce the agency risk and improve efficiency. Hence, the relation between 
independence of board and the cost of capital is expected to be negative. 
 
Hypothesis 5: CEO duality is positively related to the cost of capital. 
                                                             
4 See Upadhyay and Sriram (2011). 




CEO duality refers to the situation when the CEO also holds the position of the chairman of 
the board. An extensive of papers suggest that CEO serves simultaneously as the chair of the 
board of directors resulting in poor firm performance. Board members serve to monitor the 
management decisions. If the chairman of board is also the CEO, the CEO is more likely to 
overinvest and carry out empire-building. Overinvesting will harm the firm and increase the 
cost of capital. 
 
Hypothesis 6: Firm size should be positively related to the cost of capital. 
Firm size is not a corporate governance variable but rather a firm level control variable and is 
associated with performance in many studies. Firm size should be positively related to the 
cost of capital to the extent that large firms have greater demands for capital and more 
investment opportunities.6  
 
Hypothesis 7: Interlisted stocks should have a lower cost of capital. 
Firms can reduce their cost of capital if they can improve the liquidity of stocks and improve 
their shareholder base. International stock listing can increase both the investor base and 
liquidity since firm spends resources to make itself an eligible investment for international 
investors7. In this case, interlisted stocks should have a lower cost of capital since they have 
great access to capital markets. 
 
Hypothesis 8: The relationships between corporate governance mechanisms and the cost of 
capital differ across industries. 
As firms in different industries are subject to different competitive forces/governance 
systems8, we expect that the relationship between each governance mechanism and the cost 
of capital should be different across industries. Industry effects are captured by using industry 
                                                             
6 See Suchart et al., (2012). 
7 See Doukas and Switzer (2000) and Arauner (1996). 




dummy variables that are based on the firms’ two digit SIC codes. 
4. Data  
4.1 Sample Selection  
The data used in the analyses consists of 252 Canadian companies listed on Toronto Stock 
Exchange for which corporate governance data is available. Following the literature, 
companies in financial and utility industries are excluded from the analyses. After excluding 
firms with missing data, the final sample is a sample of 121 firms per year over the period 
2010 to 2014. 
 
Following Suchard et al. (2012), the cost of capital data is obtained from Bloomberg, where 
the weighted average cost of capital (WACC) is the outcome variable of interest. Ownership 
data, and other governance data (characteristics of the Board and Directors), and the firm 
level accounting variables are also obtained from Bloomberg. The Stock return data are 
obtained from CFMRC. 
4.2.1 Weighted Average Cost of Capital 
The cost of capital is the price of external financing and therefore the investors’ required rate 
of return. Since various claims to firms are priced differently, the weighted average cost of 
capital serves as an average price at which the firm is financing its investments. The weighted 
average cost of capital (WACC) allows us to better assess a company's financial health, both 
for internal use in capital budgeting and external use in valuing companies on investment 
markets. The WACC also can be used as a hurdle rate for investment decisions and acts as a 
measure to be minimized to find the best possible capital structure for a company.  
 
Bloomberg provides detailed data on firm capital structure and the component weights for all 
sources of capital, including equity and debt. The total capital of the company is separated 




weights are calculated by dividing each amount by total capital. The cost of equity capital is 
calculated using the Capital Asset Pricing Model. WACC can be calculated as: 
 
WACC = (Cost of Equity * Weight of Equity) + (After Tax Cost of Debt * Weight of Debt) + 
(Cost of Preferred Equity * Weight of Preferred Equity) 
 
The equity risk premium used in cost of equity is the average additional return required by 
investors as compensations for investing in equities. It represents the total return that 
investors demand for investing in the riskier equity markets. The Bloomberg method for 
calculating risk premium involves comparing the returns from treasuries and equities over a 
specified time period.  
 
The computation of equity risk premium consists of two parts. First, the expected market 
return is calculated using forecasted data based on current equity values of S&P/TSX index. 
The risk free rate is then subtracted to obtain the risk premium. The risk free rate is calculated 
using the average yield on 10 year Canadian government bonds. The risk free rate decreases 
from 3.12% in 2010 to 1.79% in 2014. The Beta used is the percentage change in the price of 
an equity given a 1% change in its benchmark index: the S&P/TSX index. When calculating 
the cost of debt, pre-tax cost of debt of the firm is determined on fair market curves. They are 
created using prices from new issue calendars, trading/portfolio systems, dealers, brokers, 
and evaluation services, which are fed directly into the specified bond sector databases on an 
overnight basis.  
4.2.2 Firm-Level Governance Variable 
This paper uses multiple corporate governance mechanisms as independent variables, 
including: board size, insider holdings, institutional holdings, board independence, and CEO 
duality. Insider holdings (%Insider) is denoted as the percentage of insider shares divided by 
shares outstanding. Insider contains a director or senior officer of a company, as well as any 




institutional ownership (%Institution) denoted as the percentage of shares outstanding held by 
institutions. For example, 13Fs, mutual funds, and insurance companies are denoted as 
institutions. The data is collected by Bloomberg and available from 2010. The board size 
(Log Board Size) is calculated as the natural logarithm of director number on board as 
reported by the company. Board independence (%Independent) refers to independent 
directors as a percentage of total board membership. CEO duality indicates whether the 
company's Chief Executive Officer is also Chairman of the Board. Interlisting dummy 
(Exchange dummy) indicates whether the firm is also listed on NYSE or NASDAQ. 
4.2.3 Firm-Level Characteristics 
Firm-level control variables that that may influence the cost of capital and firm value are 
obtained from the Bloomberg database from 2010 to 2014. Firm size (size) is measured by 
natural log of total assets. Leverage ratio (Leverage) refers to debt to assets ratio, which is 
calculated by short-term liabilities plus long-term liabilities then divided by total assets. It 
controls for the potential financial leverage effects on the cost of capital. The ratio of capital 
expenditures to total assets (CAPEX/TA) is used to control for the spending in growth firms. 
The percentage of tangible assets to total assets (TAN/TA) controls for the asset tangibility. 
The book-to-market ratio (BM) are denoted as the ratio of book value of equity divided by 
market value of equity. It is used to control for the effect of a firm’s growth prospects on the 
cost of capital.  
4.3 Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for all the variables used in my analysis. As shown, the 
mean cost of capital (WACC) of the whole sample is 10.45% within a range of 3% to 30%. 
The mean book-to-market ratio (BM) is 0.63 and the mean total asset (size) is 7.02 billion. 
These statistics reflect the fact that the sample tends to be consisted of large firms with lower 
risk profiles because the descriptive statistics are similar to the work of Suchard (2012), 




mean cost of capital varies across industries. First of all, the mean WACC is highest (13.77%) 
in Mining and lowest (5.43%) in Agriculture. The BM ratio is highest in Construction 
industry and lowest in Manufacturing. Except for the Agriculture, Construction, and 
Wholesale industries, all the rest industries in whole sample has similar mean total assets. 
That means the majority of firms are medium size firms in this three industries. Furthermore, 
Panel C presents all variable means through time. The average of the WACC decreases year 
by year since 2010.  
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
Turning to the firm level control variables, the mean ratio of CAPEX to the total asset for our 
sample is 10.63%. This ratio is to control for the discretionary spending in growth firms. This 
ratio differs among industries. In the mining industry, for example, the ratio (15.91%) is 
much higher than the average comparing to the 3.0% from manufacturing industry. The 
average financial leverage is 47.35% in whole sample. The average ratio of tangible assets to 
total assets is 85.35%. Due to industry characteristics, mining (96.21%) and manufacturing 
(93.94%) firms’ assets are almost all tangible assets. The panel C indicates that these ratios 
stay stationary in each year. 
 
Canadian firms have relatively lower insider ownership than Australian firms, which is about 
12%9. The descriptive statistics indicate that insiders hold a small percentage of firms’ shares 
with an average of 4.29%, and it is similar in U.S. firm which is around 6%10. Firms in 
manufacturing have the highest portion (7.11%), but the difference is not large compared to 
others. For our sample, the mean percentage of shares held by institutions is 49.51% and the 
difference among industries is significant. The range is from 77.04% to 31.96%. While these 
two variables are quite different among industries, they do not show much time difference as 
shown in panel C. Independent directors on board are expected to provide better monitoring 
                                                             
9 Suchard et al. (2012) 




of management actions, and mitigate agency problems, which can lower the cost of capital. 
The average proportion of independent directors on board is 77.44%. This is much higher 
when compared to U.S. firms11. This proportion is upheld across industries. Finally, the 
average board size is 9.4 members. 
 
Panel C shows that there are 38 companies interlisted both on TSX and NYSE or NASDAQ 
in the sample. Panel D shows that except for manufacturing firms, Quebec firms have higher 
cost of capital than other regions within the same industry. Panel E reports that the cost of 
capital in Canadian firms decrease since the 2010. As shown in Panel F of Table1, the cost of 
capital is relatively lower in Quebec and Ontario compared to Western Canada. Other firm 
control variables and governance variables are more comparable across regions.  
 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
Table 2 provides correlations among the firm level variables and corporate governance 
variables. The correlation coefficients between independent variables are relatively low. The 
largest one is 0.37, which is ratio of CAPEX to TAN/TA. The financial leverage is positively 
associated with insider ownership, and negatively related with institutional stock holding. 
The Exchange dummy is negatively related to those board variables. Overall, there is no 
obvious bias and outliers in the sample. 
4.4 Validation of Cost of Capital Measure 
Given that the study relies on external estimates of the cost of capital, the study conducts a 
validation regression to ensure that the estimates are sufficient proxies. According to 
Ashbaugh et al. (2004), the criteria for evaluating the validity of alternative cost of equity is 
based on the correlation between the cost of capital and risk proxies such as firm size, Beta, 
and Market to Book ratio. Previous studies suggest that the cost of capital should be 
                                                             




positively related to Beta and negatively related to MB ratio and leverage. Thus, it validates 
the cost of capital used in the study by regressing WACC on these risk variables. The 
regression used is as follows: 
 
WACC = β0 + β1 BETA +β2 SIZE + β3 MB + β4 LEVERAGE +ε 
 
The beta in the regression is average monthly beta since 2010 in the CFMRC database. The 
monthly Beta is estimated from the following equation: 
 
Log [R (t) – Rf (t)] = a + Beta*log [Rm (t) - Rf (t)] 
 
Where the Rf (t) stands for the T-bill return and Rm (t) is the return on TSX 300 total return 
index. A minimum of 24 months of returns over the past 60 months are required before a beta 
is calculated. To make it more convincing, every firm is set as an observation. All the 
independent variables and the dependent variable including the beta are mean variables from 
2010 to 2014. Thus the study gets 121 observations for the regression.    
 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
The first four columns in Table 3 report the results of OLS regressions where WACC is 
regressed respectively on Beta, Size, MB, and Leverage. The last column shows the results of 
the model that includes all proxies. As from the table, the results prove that the WACC is 
strongly related to the proxies. The Beta explains nearly 50% of the variation in the cost of 
capital and significantly positive related to the cost of capital. In addition, the Size, MB ratio, 
and leverage are all negatively related to the WACC. The negative effect of leverage on the 
cost of capital shows that increasing the leverage ratio can reduce the cost of capital. From 
the column 5, the model explains 71.2% of the variations of WACC and suggests that the 




5. Methodology and Empirical Results 
5.1 The effects of governance on the firm contemporaneous cost of capital 
This section introduces the main methods and empirical results. As our study focuses on the 
relationship between the cost of capital and corporate governance mechanisms, we first test 
the effects of these governance mechanisms on the contemporaneous cost of capital. We also 
conduct the analysis using Weighted Least Squares (WLS) to account for hetereoscedasticity. 
As the WACC is truncated above zero, a Tobit model is also used. We test the effect of 
corporate governance on the contemporaneous cost of capital by using the following 
regression: 
 
WACC it =β0 + β1 %Institution it+ β2 %Insider it+ β3 %Independent it+ β4 Log Board Size it  
�=1������� +εit                    (1) 
 
�=1������� stands for all firm control variables as previously defined. Table 4 presents 
regression results of the whole sample. The first three column reports the results of regression 
estimated using OLS regression. The results indicate that firm size, CAPEX/TA, leverage 
ratio and TAN/TA all have a significant impact on the firms’ contemporaneous cost of capital. 
The results suggest that smaller firms with higher financial leverage can lower their cost of 
capital. The rationale behind this is that after the financial crisis, the cost of debt in Canadian 
market decreased. As a result, firms can lower their cost of capital simply by increasing their 
debt. The combination of lower required return on equity and effective cost of debt can help 
reduce cost of capital. The firm can absorb more debt before reaching the optimal capital 
structure, which enables the benefit from debt tax shield and reduces the cost of capital. 
 
The other two control variables: CAPEX/TA and TAN/TA are both positively related to the 
cost of capital. The CAPEX/TA variable stands for a firm’s investment cash flow over total 




be associated with greater risk. This characteristic will lead investors to demand a high 
required rate of return. Firms with more tangible assets are usually in mining and 
manufacturing industries, which are capital-intensive industries. Large capital demand will 
increase investors’ required rate of return thus increase the firm’s cost of capital. 
 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
Governance variables, institutional ownership, insider ownership, and board size are all 
significantly related to firm’s cost of capital with expected signs. The results confirm that 
corporate governance mechanisms play an important role in the firm’s cost of capital. It 
reports that the coefficient of insider ownership is negative, -0.027. The result is more 
significant in the WLS regression. Furthermore, it is negative and significant across all 
models, which suggests that higher insider ownership can reduce the cost of capital 
efficiently in all industries. It is consistent with the hypothesis that insider ownership can 
align the interest between management and shareholders and improve firm performance 
through reducing the cost of capital. This finding is also consistent with the findings of Core 
et al. (2015) that insider ownership acts as a substitute for disclosure quality and can reduce 
the firm’s cost of capital. 
 
The institutional ownership is significant positively related to firm contemporaneous cost of 
capital suggesting that higher institutional ownership can result in a higher cost of capital. At 
first glance, it may seem that institutions are detrimental to corporate governance. However, 
the direct effect of institutional ownership is that it likely influences greater firm investment, 
and invest in firms with higher betas. More investment activities will increase the firm’s cost 
of capital. The possible reason is that institutions tend to invest in high expected return and 
high risk firms. 
   
The results show that the coefficients on the number of board size is significant and 




firm performance and reduce cost of capital efficiently. However, the percentage of 
independent directors on board and CEO Duality are insignificant. Given that whether 
CEO also holds the position of the chairman of the board will not change firm’s decisions, it 
is not surprising that this variable is not statistically significant. However, the CEO duality 
variable is significant in the WLS regression. It indicates that if the CEO and chairman of 
board is the same person, the cost of capital is higher. The results show that interlisted firm’s 
cost of capital is lower than firms only listed on TSX when board variables are excluded. This 
can be explained by the negative correlations between exchange dummy and board variables 
as shown in table 2.  
 
The remaining six columns of Table 4 report that the results of the regression uses Tobit and 
WLS respectively. The signs of all variables are same across all of the regressions. According 
to the adjusted R2, the WLS model can explain 48.6 percent variations in the changes of cost 
of capital, which indicates that governance mechanisms provide additional explanatory power 
beyond the firm control variables.  
5.2 The effects of governance on the firm next year’s cost of capital 
We continue our study by using the methodology of Suchard (2012) to test whether the 
corporate governance will also affect next year’s cost of capital. We can reduce any potential 
endogeneity problem by using the next year’s cost of capital. As discussed above, governance 
mechanisms have significant effects on reducing firm’s contemporaneous cost of capital, the 
effects might also have a time lag as they are not directly affecting cost of capital. In this part, 
all the independent variables are lagged by one fiscal period to minimize any potential 
endogeneity. We test the effect of corporate governance on the firm next year’s cost of capital 
by using the following regression: 
 
WACC it =β0 + β1 %Institution it-1+ β2 %Insider it-1+ β3 %Independent it-1+ β4 Log Board Size it-1  





�=1������−1� stands for all of the firm control variables lagged by one year as previously 
defined. Table 5 presents regression results examining whether various governance variables 
and control variables are associated with the firm next year’s cost of capital using the 121 
firms for four years. As all the independent variables are one fiscal period lagged, we are left 
with a sample of 484 observations. The signs of all variables are same with previous model. 
The results indicate that CAPEX/TA, leverage ratio, BM, firm size, and TAN/TA all have 
significant impacts on the firm next year’s cost of capital. The results suggest that the firm 
with large investment inputs and size, more tangible assets, and lower financial leverage will 
have higher cost of capital in the next year.  
 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
The results for governance variables become more significant over time. Insider ownership 
and board size are both significantly related to the firm’s cost of capital in the next year with 
expected signs. The results present that the coefficient of insider holding is negatively and 
significantly better than a 1% level. Moreover, the economic impact of insider holding on the 
firm next year’s cost of capital is nearly two times than contemporaneous year. These results 
suggest that better corporate governance can affect firm next year’s performance. Although 
institutional holding is insignificant in this regression, it becomes significant in the WLS 
regression suggesting that more institutional ownership will also increase next year’s cost of 
capital. This will support the projection that institutional investors tend to invest in high 
expected return and high risk firms. 
 
The results show that the coefficients on the number of board size is still significant and even 
get larger compared with previous results. As for the CEO duality, the coefficient become 
significant in the next year’s regression. Because CEO duality is an indirect mechanism and 
its effect on the cost of capital has a time lag. More insider holdings, larger boards, the 
separation of CEO and board chair will efficiently reduce contemporaneous and next year’s 




Both the adjusted R2 and the log likelihood suggest that this regression gains more 
explanation power than the previous one. 
5.3 The effects of governance on the firm next year’s cost of capital among industries 
The descriptive statistics indicate that the governance mechanisms vary across different 
industries. Due to limited companies in some industries, two major industrial dummy 
variables are added into regression at the first step. Then the whole sample is split into eight 
subsamples by using the first two-digits of SIC codes. We denote Mining-Dummy if the firm 
is in the mining industry then we set it as 1, and the others are 0. This industry mainly 
includes metal mining firms, bituminous coal and lignite mining, and oil and gas extraction. 
These companies are all capital intensive companies that have a huge capital demand. 
Whether corporate governance can reduce the cost of capital efficiently would be very 
important to those firms. The other industry dummy included in the regression is 
manufacturing-dummy. We denote Manufacturing-Dummy equals to 1 if the firm is in the 
manufacturing industry, and the others are 0. This industry consists of food products, tobacco 
products, apparel, and wood products. To minimize any potential endogeneity issue, we use 
firm next year’s cost of capital as a dependent variable, and the model used is as follows: 
 
WACC it =β0 + β1 %Institution it-1+ β2 %Insider it-1+ β3 %Independent it-1+ β4 LogBoard Size it-1  
�=1������−1� +εit-1     (3)      
 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
 
Table 6 reports that two added industrial dummies are both positively significant which 
means firms’ cost of capital in these two industries are significantly higher than firms in other 
industries. Firms in the mining industry have the highest cost of capital and the difference can 
be up to 3.34% while holding the other conditions constant. The results also indicate that the 
firms in the manufacturing industry will spend 0.62% more on the cost of capital than the 





After considering difference in industry, the CEO Duality coefficient becomes more 
significant in the regression. The results show that if the CEO and chairman of the board are 
the same person, the firm will tend to spend 1.41 percent more on the cost of capital. This 
implies a CEO with less monitoring might overinvest due to the empire building effect. The 
results for insider holding remains to be the most important variable among all the 
governance variables. It is significantly and negatively associated with the cost of capital 
even after controlling for the industry effect. This indicates that improving insider ownership 
is a good method to reduce cost of capital that is applicable to all industries.  
 
To further assess the governance mechanisms in different industries, we repeat the analysis 
by using firms in manufacturing, mining, and transportation industries. The results show both 
similarities and differences in these three industries. Firstly, the signs of the firm control 
variables such as size, leverage ratio and TAN/TA are the same with the previous results. 
However, the coefficient of CAPEX/TA is only significant in the mining industry. Such 
results surprisingly enhance my expectations regarding the firm characteristic hypotheses. As 
for governance mechanisms, insider ownership is always significant in all industries. 
However, the significantly positive coefficient of institutional ownership only exists in the 
transportation industry. It suggests that the institutional ownership effect is not an overall 
effect in all industries. In the mining industry, only insider ownership and CEO duality are 
significant. The coefficients of the CEO Duality dummy and board size are all insignificant in 
manufacturing companies. In the manufacturing industry, firm’s characteristic and insider 
ownership have more impact on the cost of capital.  
 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
 
In Table 7, the regression results of mining companies are similar with the whole sample 
results except for the board size variable. The firm control variables in mining companies are 




independent director percentage, are both insignificant in this subsample. The coefficient on 
insider holding is significantly negative and is five times large as the whole sample. The 
economic impact of insider holding in the mining companies on cost of capital is dramatic. 
An increase of one standard deviation in insider ownership decreases cost of capital by 
0.125%. In this subsample, the coefficient of CEO Duality suggests that, in the mining 
industry, cost of capital is affected more significantly by insider ownership.  
 
The results of regression in the transportation industry subsample provide similar results with 
the whole sample. Except for firm size, the firm control variables are very consistent with the 
expectations. The coefficient of institutional ownership suggests that the economic impacts 
for institution ownership are much higher for transportation firms than firms in other 
industries. In addition, the CEO Duality is positively and significantly related to the cost of 
capital which is consistent with the expectations. Unexpectedly, almost all coefficients of 
governance mechanisms are significant in transportation firms except for the insider 
ownership and board size. The signs of these two variables in this subsample are not 
consistent with the whole sample suggesting that the transportation firms can improve their 
performance through a smaller board and fewer insider ownership. 
5.4 The effects of governance on the firm contemporaneous cost of capital among 
regions 
In order to test the relation between the cost of capital and governance mechanisms across 
different regions, we run the following regression after controlling the time and regional 
difference. The regression is presented as below: 
 
WACC it =β0 + β1 %Institution it+ β2 %Insider it+ β3 %Independent it+ β4 Log Board Size it 
�=1������� + εit   (4) 
 
Where ON Dummy equals to 1 if the firm’s headquarter is located in Ontario and 0 otherwise. 
QC Dummy equals to 1 if the firm’s headquarter is located in Quebec and 0 otherwise. The 




Manitoba, and Saskatchewan provinces. Finally, the year fixed effects is used to test whether 
the cost of capital is decreasing. 
 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
 
As shown in Table 8, we insert regional dummy into the regression. The results show that 
Quebec firm’s cost of capital is much lower than other Canadian provinces. This can be 
explained by the industry structure in Quebec. Most of Quebec firms in the sample are 
manufacturing, transportation, and retail firms. Those firms have a lower cost of capital than 
firms in other industries. Thus, firm domiciled in Quebec has a lower cost of capital than 
firms domiciled outside of Quebec. The ON dummy also shows a negative effect on the cost 
of capital due to same reason. From the coefficient of the year’s fixed effects, the cost of 
capital is consecutively decreasing from 2010 to 2014. Interestingly, after controlling the time 
and region, the effect of institutional ownership on the cost of capital becomes more 
significant.      
5.5 Endogeneity Issue 
The preceding analyses treat governance attributes as being exogenously determined. 
According to Himmelberg et al., (1999), fixed effects estimators should be used in 
examination of the relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance to 
control for the unobservable features. To further minimize the effects of endogeneity, we 
choose to use the firm’s fixed effects approach to control for the unobservable features that 
affect cost of capital. The model used is as follows: 
WACC it =β0 + β1 %Institution it-1+ β2 %Insider it-1+ β3 %Independent it-1+ β4 LogBoard Size it-1  
�=1������−1� + λ i+ εit-1                       (5) 
�=1������−1� stands for all firm control variables as previously defined. We use the firm 
next year’s cost of capital as the dependent variable to minimize any potential concern. Table 





[Insert Table 9 here] 
 
In Table 9, the institutional ownership variable is significantly and positively related to the 
firm next year’s cost of capital as predicted while it is not statistically significant in the 
previous regressions. This implies that firms with greater institutional investors usually have 
high expected return. Regarding the differential, estimates using fixed effects method reveal 
that the independent variables are all statistically significant with signs as we had predicted. 
The negatively significant coefficient of insider ownership confirms our expectation that 
insider holdings can align the interests between the management and shareholders thus reduce 
the cost of capital. The board size is positive but not significant in the fixed effects model.  
 
The firm control variables, CAPEX/TA, leverage ratio, and BM ratio are all significantly 
related to the cost of capital. According to previous results, CEO Duality is not significant in 
many occasions thus are excluded from robustness analysis. Recall that firm size proxy for 
total assets of a company are expected to be positively related to the cost of capital. In 
column 4 of Table 8, however, the coefficient for firm size is not significant after controlling 
it for unobserved effects. The TAN/TA variable is also insignificant with a negative sign. The 
significant negative coefficient for debt ratio supports previous studies. In summary, the 
results are consistent with the major hypothesis of this paper stating that the presence of 
increased insider holding reduces firm’s cost of capital. The coefficients for other explanatory 
variables are also generally consistent with the previous studies. 
6. Conclusion 
In this study, the empirical results shed light in the effects of corporate governance on the cost 
of capital in Canadian markets. Following Suchard et al., (2012), the study investigates the 
relationship between the corporate governance mechanisms such as insider ownership, board 
size, and institutional ownership and the cost of capital. We find that insider ownership can 




management and shareholders. 
 
We test these hypotheses by using a sample of 121 Canadian firms that listed on Toronto 
Stock Exchange from 2010 to 2014. We examine the impact of governance mechanisms on 
firm contemporaneous cost of capital, and find that insider ownership and board size are both 
significantly and negatively related to the contemporaneous cost of capital. While both the 
institutional ownership and CEO duality are positively related to the cost of capital, the effect 
of independent board directors is not that visible. Also, in order to further minimize any 
potential endogeneity issues, we examine the role of governance mechanisms on the firm 
next year’s cost of capital. The main conclusions remain unchanged. 
 
When comparing the governance characteristics in different industries, we find that the 
effects of governance mechanisms on the cost of capital are different among industries. To 
further investigate the difference, we add industry dummies and split data into industry 
subsamples. Results from the analysis suggest that more insider ownership can effectively 
reduce the firm next year’s cost of capital in the mining and manufacturing industries, but it 
will increase the cost of capital of transportation firms. Firms in the transportation industry 
can reduce their cost of capital through lower institutional ownership, insider ownership, and 
small board size. Exploring why some mechanisms are not effective in different industries, or 
have different impacts remains a topic for future research. In addition, after controlling the 
time and region, the effects become more significant. This study also suggests that firms 
domiciled in Quebec have lower cost of capital is caused by different industrial structure. The 
robustness test employs firm fixed effects regression to minimize potential endogeneity and it 
confirms the results discussed above. 
 
The paper makes several contributions to the literature. First, we provide new evidence on the 
role of corporate governance during the post financial crisis period. Second, while most work 
has examined U.S. markets we look at the Canada, and find that unlike most US studies, we 




capital in Canada. The study also highlights differential impacts of governance mechanisms 
for firms across industries and regions in Canada. Canadian mining firms have a higher cost 
of capital than firms in other industries. In mining firms, insider ownership is negatively 
associated with the cost of capital, and it serves to reduce agency costs. In the transportation 
industry, both institutional ownership and insider ownership are positively related to the cost 
of capital. In the manufacturing sector, firm characteristics and insider ownership have more 
impacts on the cost of capital. Exploring in depth potential causes for these differentials is a 
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Appendix I  
Variable Definitions 
Variable Definitions and Data Source 
Firm control variables 
CAPEX/ TA (%) 
Percentage of capital expenditures to total assets. (source Bloomberg) 
Leverage (%) 
Short-term liabilities plus long-term liabilities then divided by total assets. 
(source Bloomberg) 
TAN/TA (%) 
Percentage of tangible assets to total assets. (source Bloomberg) 
BM 
Ratio of book value of equity divided by market value of equity (source 
Bloomberg) 
Beta 
Monthly Beta using the following model: 
log[R(t) - Rf(t)] = a + Beta*log [Rm(t) - Rf(t)] 
Estimated over the 60 months prior to a firm-year requiring minimum of 18 
months. (source CFMRC) 
TA Total assets of the company at the end of each year(source Bloomberg) 
size Natural log of total assets at the end of each year (source Bloomberg) 
Firm governance variables 
%Institution  Percentage of shares held by institutional investors. (source Bloomberg) 
%Insider 
Percentage of shares held by insiders including officers and directors. 
(source Bloomberg) 
%Independent 
Percentage of independent directors on the board. (source Bloomberg) 
Log Board Size 
Natural log of number of directors on the company's board. (source 
Bloomberg) 
CEO Duality 
If company's Chief Executive Officer is also Chairman of the Board, then 
denotes 1, otherwise 0. (source Bloomberg) 
Interlisted Dummy 
If the company is also listed on NYSE or NASDAQ, then denotes1, 









Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive Statistics  





Min Median Max Skewness Kurtosis 
WACC (%) 10.45 4.11 3.14 9.61 29.93 1.12 1.39 
CAPEX/ TA (%) 10.63 9.34 0.02 8.02 59.28 1.62 3.16 
Leverage (%) 47.35 17.52 2.58 48.46 90.85 -0.22 -0.38 
TAN/TA (%) 85.35 18.72 8.55 93.28 100.00 -1.53 1.66 
BM 0.63 0.71 0.04 0.49 5.13 2.82 2.46 
%Institution  49.51 23.34 0.00 47.40 95.01 0.23 -0.64 
%Insider 4.29 8.67 0.00 1.32 78.22 1.90 3.14 
%Independent 77.44 11.58 37.50 80.00 100.00 -0.59 -0.56 
Board Size 9.40 3.30 4.00 9.00 20.00 5.49 78.00 
CEO Duality 0.16 0.36 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.91 1.65 
TA(Billion) 7.02 12.27 0.04 2.14 79.67 3.04 10.36 
        













WACC (%) 5.43 9.96 9.62 13.77 7.28 8.48 7.94 9.56 
CAPEX/ TA (%) 3.95 3.44  7.50 15.54  4.33  3.00  8.69  4.30 
Leverage (%) 72.07 58.91  50.62 36.08  52.38  54.31  61.43  60.71 
TAN/TA (%) 67.85 93.94  86.13 96.21  82.73  57.39  74.56  88.13 
BM 0.31  0.86 0.71 0.73   0.58 0.38 0.42 0.38 
%Institution  77.04  57.19  54.78  50.70  38.87  60.60  48.38  31.96 
%Insider 3.90  2.02  7.11  3.45  6.88  4.15  2.20  1.50 
%Independent 84.62  84.09  75.62  77.35  70.58  81.07  80.92  85.71 
Board Size 13.00  8.10  9.59  8.65  11.57  9.02  10.43  9.13 
CEO Duality 0  1 0.10 0.06 0.21 0.07 0.19 0.09 
TA(Billion) 0.71  1.94 7.93 6.21 7.02 2.92 12.45 1.93 
N 5 10 125 210 60 55 115 25 
         
PANEL C: Sample Distribution 
 Firms Listed solely on TSX Firm Interlisted both on TSX and NYSE or 
NASDAQ 






Table 1 Continued 





Mining Retail Services 
Transpo
rtation 
Quebec 21 8.26 17.94 7.98 8.92 8.15 
Other Regions 100 10.05 13.67 6.83 8.32 7.86 
 
       PANEL E: Sample Mean of All Variables in Different Years 
 
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
WACC (%) 12.92 10.77 10.42 9.31 9.33 
CAPEX/ TA (%) 8.35 10.02 10.44 9.86 9.51 
Leverage (%) 46.92 48.32 47.81 49.36 49.74 
TAN/TA (%) 86.23 85.52 84.95 84.21 83.59 
BM 0.56 0.64 0.62 0.57 0.65 
%Institution 49.02 49.57 48.04 51.33 53.05 
%Insider 4.66 3.93 4.72 4.18 4.02 
%Independent 76.15 77.90 77.85 77.79 78.75 
Board Size 9.71 9.54 9.34 9.47 9.59 
CEO Duality 0.19 0.15 0.11 0.09 0.10 
TA(Billion) 6.99 6.42 6.85 7.65 8.44 
      
               PANEL F: Sample Mean of All Variables in Different Provinces 
 
AB BC MB ON QC SK 
WACC (%) 11.33 12.54 6.39 9.42 8.72 12.79 
CAPEX/TA (%) 14.29 9.65 9.76 6.21 5.95 9.37 
Leverage (%) 48.64 40.36 59.96 50.60 51.43 42.15 
TAN/TA (%) 92.46 89.12 89.40 79.34 73.08 98.64 
BM 0.60 0.56 0.41 0.70 0.56 0.42 
%Institution 44.20 54.75 32.48 51.36 56.37 74.07 
%Insider 4.55 4.20 0.81 5.74 2.08 0.40 
%Independent 77.93 81.93 89.98 75.45 76.65 83.05 
Board Size 8.92 9.20 10.00 9.39 10.67 12.30 
CEO Duality 0.11 0.15 0.00 0.14 0.15 0.00 
TA(Billion) 9.95 7.15 1.96 4.28 6.66 12.45 
Notes: This table presents descriptive statistics for the key governance variables and firm control variables. All variables are 
explained in Appendix I. Panel A provides descriptive statistics for dependent and independent variables described. The 
sample period is from 2010 to 2014. The variables are the weighted average cost of capital (WACC), the ratio of capital 
expenditures to total assets (CAPEX/TA), total liabilities over total assets (Leverage), tangible long term assets (property, 
plant and equipment) over total assets (TAN/TA), book value to market value ratio (BM), percentage ownership of 
institutional shareholders (%Institution), percentage ownership of insider shareholders (%Insider), proportion of directors 
who are independent directors (%Independent), the number of directors (Board Size), the separation of CEO and chair of 
board (CEO Duality), book value of total assets (TA). Statistics are calculated based on pooled data across all firms and all 
years. Panel B provides statistics on the average variables by industries. Panel C provides statistics on the sample structure of 
interlisted proportion. Panel D provides statistics on the average cost of capital in Quebec and other regions. Panel E 




Table 2. Correlation Matrix 
 CAPEX/TA TAN/TA BM %Institution %Insider %Independent Log_Board size  Size Leverage CEO Duality 
Duality 
ExchangeDummy 
CAPEX/TA 1           
            
TAN/TA 0.3728 1          
 <.0001           
BM -0.0755 0.1287 1         
 0.1418 0.0121          
%Institution  -0.1258 -0.0766 -0.06
574 
1        
 0.0141 0.1362 0.201         
%Insider -0.0220 0.0304 0.131
6 
-0.2766 1       
 0.6688 0.5548 0.010
2 
<.0001        
%Independent  -0.1135 0.0093 -0.13
766 
0.2175 -0.2833 1      
 0.027 0.8567 0.007
2 
<.0001 <.0001       
Log_Board Size -0.2450 -0.2531 -0.15
762 
0.1775 -0.2091 0.1207 1     
 <.0001 <.0001 0.002
1 
0.0005 <.0001 0.0186      
Size 0.0192 -0.0007 -0.15
061 
0.1041 -0.2339 0.2154 0.3582 1    
 0.7097 0.9885 0.003
3 
0.0426 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001     
Leverage -0.2867 -0.2578 -0.14
156 
-0.0632 0.0454 0.1116 0.3463 0.3278 1   
 <.0001 <.0001 0.005
7 
0.2194 0.3773 0.0297 <.0001 <.0001    
CEO Duality -0.0131 0.0511 -0.03
529 
-0.1950 0.0228 -0.0842 -0.1558 -0.1447 0.0728 1  
 0.7991 0.3204 0.4 2
8 













































Notes: This table presents the Pearson correlation coefficients for the key firm characteristics and governance measures. It contains the ratio of capital expenditures to total assets (CAPEX/TA), tangible 
long term assets over total assets (TAN/TA), book value to market value ratio (BM), percentage ownership of institutional shareholders (%Institution), percentage ownership of insider shareholders 
(%Insider), proportion of directors who are independent directors (%Independent), the natural logarithm of director number (Log_Board Size), the natural logarithm of total assets (Size), total liabilities 
over total assets (Leverage), the separation of CEO and chair of board (CEO duality), Exchange dummy (Exchange) denotes 1 if firm is also listed on NYSE, NASDAQ, else 0. P-values are reported 




Table 3. Cross-Sectional Validation of WACC 
 Dependent Variable: Weighted Average Cost of Capital 
Model 1 2 3 4 5 
Intercept 0.060*** 0.102*** 0.115*** 0.169*** 0.118*** 
 
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
BETA 0.034*** 

























   
-0.001*** -0.001*** 
    
<.0001 <.0001 
Adjusted R2 0.497 0.384 0.403 0.456 0.712 
N 121 121 121 121 121 
*.**. *** indicates significance at the level of 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01. 
Notes: The table provides the cross-sectional OLS regression estimates for cost of capital (WACC) regressed on 
BETA measured as the beta of individual firm calculated using monthly stock returns, size measured as the 
natural logarithm of total assets (Size), the market-to-book value ratio (MB) and Leverage measured as total 
liabilities over total assets (Leverage). All variables are averaged across the sample period such that each firm is 

















Table 4. Governance Effects on the Firm Contemporaneous Cost of Capital 
Notes: The table provides the results for the OLS, Tobit, and WLS regressions of the contemporaneous cost of capital on governance variables and controls variables described in equation (1). The dependent 
variable is the contemporaneous weighted average cost of capital (WACC). The independent variables are the natural logarithm of total assets (Size), the ratio of capital expenditures to total assets (CAPEX/TA), 
total liabilities over total assets (Leverage), tangible long term assets over total assets (TAN/TA), book value to market value ratio (BM), percentage ownership of institutional shareholders (%Institution), 
percentage ownership of insider shareholders (%Insider), proportion of directors who are independent directors (%Independent), the natural logarithm of director number (Log Board Size), the separation of CEO 
and chair of board (CEO Duality), the Exchange dummy denotes 1 if firm is also listed on NYSE, NASDAQ, else 0.. T-values are reported below each of the coefficients in OLS and WLS, and Z values are 
reported below each of the coefficients in Tobit. *.**. *** indicates significance at the level of 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01. 
  OLS Regression Weighted Least Squares Tobit Model 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Intercept 10.609*** 13.793*** 14.04***     11.586*** 14.226*** 14.30*** 10.609*** 13.793*** 14.04*** 
  (11.95) (7.76) (7.69) (15.47) (9.41) (9.13) (12.04) (7.93) (7.77) 
Size 0.478** 1.06*** 0.961*** -0.002 0.685*** 0.533** 0.478** 1.06*** 0.961*** 
  (2) (3.72) (3.36) (-0.01) (2.71) (2.12) (2.01) (3.76) (3.39) 
CAPEX/TA 0.071*** 0.062*** 0.064*** 0.052*** 0.05*** 0.054*** 0.071*** 0.062*** 0.064*** 
  (4.05) (3.47) (3.57) (3.17) (3.22) (3.51) (4.08) (3.5) (3.61) 
Leverage -0.115*** -0.117*** -0.114*** -0.113*** -0.114*** -0.111*** -0.115*** -0.117*** -0.114*** 
  (-14.14) (-14.63) (-13.95) (-15.24) (-15.83) (-15.28) (-14.25) (-14.75) (-14.09) 
TAN/TA 0.051*** 0.048*** 0.050*** 0.044*** 0.043*** 0.043*** 0.051*** 0.048*** 0.050*** 
  (6.72) (6.28) (6.54) (7.62) (7.62) (7.91) (6.77) (6.33) (6.61) 
BM -0.033 -0.138 -0.112 -0.256 -0.211 -0.131 -0.033 -0.138 -0.112 
  (-0.11) (-0.45) (-0.47) (-0.89) (-0.72) (-0.46) (-0.11) (-0.45) (-0.37) 
%Institution 0.007   0.009 0.01*   0.013** 0.007   0.009 
  (1.19)   (1.6) (1.9)   (2.49) (1.2)   (1.61) 
%Insider -0.026*   -0.027* -0.018   -0.027** -0.026*   -0.027* 
  (-1.76)   (-1.78) (-1.23)   (-2.15) (-1.77)   (-1.8) 
%Independent   0.007 -0.001   -0.01 -0.012   0.007 -0.001 
    (0.59) (-0.05)   (-1.02) (-1.19)   (0.59) (-0.05) 
Log Board Size   -3.448** -3.8***   -1.87 -2.545**   -3.448** -3.8*** 
    (-2.45) (-2.7)   (-1.58) (-2.12)   (-2.47) (-2.73) 
CEO Duality   0.617 0.638   0.889** 0.872**   0.617 0.638 
    (1.56) (1.61)   (2.13) (2.09)   (1.58) (1.63) 
Exchange Dummy -0.076 0.103 0.001 -0.281 0.019 -0.082 -0.076 0.103 0.001 
 (-0.27) (0.37) (0.003) (-1.14) (0.08) (-0.34) (-0.27) (0.38) (0.003) 
Adjusted R2 0.428 0.431 0.435 0.474 0.481 0.485    
Log Likelihood -1524 -1522 -1518 -1492 -1478 -1475 -1524 -1522 -1518 




Table 5. Governance Effects on the Firm Next Year’s Cost of Capital 
Notes: The table provides the results for the OLS, Tobit, and WLS regressions of next year’s cost of capital on the variables described in equation (2). The dependent variable is the next year’s weighted average 
cost of capital (WACC). The independent variables are the natural logarithm of total assets (Size), the ratio of capital expenditures to total assets (CAPEX/TA), total liabilities over total assets (Leverage), tangible 
long term assets over total assets (TAN/TA), book value to market value ratio (BM), percentage ownership of institutional shareholders (%Institution), percentage ownership of insider shareholders (%Insider), 
proportion of directors who are independent directors (%Independent), the natural logarithm of director number (Log Board Size), the separation of CEO and chair of board (CEO Duality), the Exchange dummy 
denotes 1 if firm is also listed on NYSE, NASDAQ, else 0. T-values are reported below each of the coefficients in OLS and WLS, and Z values are reported below each of the coefficients in Tobit. *.**. *** indicates 
significance at the level of 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01. 
  OLS Regression Weighted Least Squares Tobit Model 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Intercept 10.392*** 12.582*** 13.319*** 11.165*** 13.185*** 14.379*** 10.392*** 12.583*** 13.319*** 
  (12.46) (7.45) (7.7) (15.04) (9.02) (9.95) (12.58) (7.52) (7.80) 
Size 0.337 0.913*** 0.827*** -0.197 0.511** 0.562*** 0.337 0.913*** 0.827*** 
  (1.48) (3.37) (3.06) (-1.09) (2.13) (2.79) (1.49) (3.41) (3.10) 
CAPEX/TA 0.094*** 0.088*** 0.088*** 0.072*** 0.067*** 0.067*** 0.094*** 0.088*** 0.087*** 
  (5.53) (5.11) (5.11) (4.29) (4.15) (4.27) (5.59) (5.16) (5.17) 
Leverage -0.109*** -0.111*** -0.108*** -0.101*** -0.104*** -0.1*** -0.109*** -0.111*** -0.108*** 
  (-13.98) (-14.54) (-13.87) (-14.05) (-15.05) (-14.75) (-14.11) (-14.69) (-14.05) 
TAN/TA 0.041*** 0.037*** 0.039*** 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.032*** 0.041*** 0.037*** 0.039*** 
  (5.74) (5.19) (5.5) (5.96) (5.99) (6.39) (5.8) (5.25) (5.57) 
BM 0.546* 0.498 0.525* 0.312 0.24 0.325 0.546* 0.498 0.525* 
  (1.76) (1.61) (1.71) (1.03) (0.77) (1.36) (1.78) (1.63) (1.73) 
%Institution 0.003   0.006 0.007   0.01* 0.003   0.006 
  (0.61)   (1.01) (1.34)   (1.89) (0.62)   (1.02) 
%Insider -0.04***   -0.037*** -0.039***   -0.042*** -0.04***   -0.037*** 
  (-3.03)   (-2.76) (-5.5)   (-7.67) (-3.06)   (-2.8) 
%Independent   0.02* 0.01   0.001 -0.006   0.020* 0.01 
    (1.76) (0.84)   (0.01) (-0.66)   (1.78) (0.85) 
Log Board Size   -3.746*** -4.132***   -2.316** -3.447***   -3.746*** -4.132*** 
    (-2.82) (-3.12)   (-2.04) (-3.04)   (-2.85) (-3.16) 
CEO Duality   0.836** 0.763*   1.003** 0.89**   0.836** 0.763** 
    (2.12) (1.94)   (2.3) (1.98)   (2.14) (1.96) 
Exchange Dummy -0.093 0.132 0.024 -0.196 0.171 0.097 -0.094 0.132 0.023 
 (-0.35) (0.5) (0.09) (-0.81) (0.74) (0.4) (-0.35) (0.5) (0.09) 
Adjusted R2 0.512 0.516 0.525 0.538 0.528 0.619      
Log Likelihood -1133 -1130 -1125 -1109 -1099 -1086 -1133 -1130 -1125 




Table 6. Governance Effects on the Firm Next Year’s Cost of Capital (Industry Dummies) 
Notes: The table provides the results for the OLS, Tobit, and WLS regressions of the cost of capital in next year on governance variables, controls variables, and industry dummy variables described in equation (3). 
The dependent variable is the weighted average cost of capital in the next year (WACC). The independent variables are same with table 5. The Ming dummy denotes 1 if firm is in mining industry, else 0. The 
Manufacturing dummy denotes 1 if firm is in manufacturing industry, else 0. T-values are reported below each of the coefficients in OLS and WLS, and Z values are reported below each of the coefficients in Tobit. 
*.**. *** indicates significance at the level of 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01. 
  OLS Regression Weighted Least Squares Tobit Model 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Intercept 10.141*** 10.248*** 10.923*** 11.061*** 10.867*** 11.841*** 10.141*** 10.248*** 10.923*** 
  (12.77) (6.29) (6.54) (16.5) (8.23) (8.73) (12.91) (6.36) (6.63) 
Size 0.181 0.546** 0.498* -0.245 0.235 0.294 0.181 0.546** 0.498* 
  (0.83) (2.1) (1.92) (-1.38) (1.06) (1.37) (0.84) (2.13) (1.95) 
CAPEX/TA 0.041** 0.035** 0.036** 0.003 0.005 0.008 0.041** 0.035** 0.036** 
  (2.27) (1.97) (2.04) (0.17) (0.3) (0.49) (2.29) (1.99) (2.07) 
Leverage -0.085*** -0.086*** -0.084*** -0.068*** -0.074*** -0.072*** -0.085*** -0.086*** -0.084*** 
  (-10.46) (-10.84) (-10.52) (-9.43) (-11.03) (-10.69) (-10.57) (-10.97) (-10.67) 
TAN/TA 0.030*** 0.025*** 0.026*** 0.017*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.030*** 0.024*** 0.026*** 
  (4.18) (3.45) (3.67) (3.41) (4.53) (4.68) (4.22) (3.49) (3.72) 
BM 0.072 -0.027 0.018 -0.475 -0.543* -0.374 0.072 -0.027 0.018 
  (0.24) (-0.09) (0.06) (-1.47) (-1.77) (-1.28) (0.24) (-0.09) (0.06) 
%Institution 0.001   0.003 -0.002   0.004 0.001   0.003 
  (0.26)   (0.63) (-1.47)   (0.89) (0.27)   (0.64) 
%Insider -0.033***   -0.029** -0.032***   -0.034*** -0.034***   -0.029** 
  (-2.65)   (-2.24) (-3.84)   (-4.78) (-2.68)   (-2.27) 
%Independent   0.024** 0.017   0.002 -0.003   0.024** 0.017 
    (2.24) (1.5)   (0.2) (-0.39)   (2.27) (1.52) 
Log Board Size   -2.048 -2.415*   -0.649 -1.514   -2.048 -2.415* 
    (-1.62) (-1.9)   (-0.63) (-1.45)   (-1.64) (-1.93) 
CEO Duality   1.477*** 1.409***   1.589*** 1.379***   1.477*** 1.409*** 
    (3.83) (3.65)   (3.83) (3.33) 
 
 
  (3.87) (3.70) 
Mining Dummy 2.572*** 2.933*** 2.833*** 3.335*** 3.271*** 3.148*** 2.572*** 2.933*** 2.833*** 
  (6.7) (7.46) (7.18) (8.79) (9.04) (8.7) (6.77) (7.54) (7.28) 
Manufacturing 
Dummy 
0.341 0.606* 0.616* 0.562** 0.469* 0.568** 0.341 0.606* 0.616* 
  (1.02) (1.82) (1.82) (2.02) (1.82) (2.2) (1.03) (1.84) (1.85) 
Adjusted R2 0.558 0.571 0.575 0.536 0.582 0.594    
Log Likelihood -1109 -1101 -1098 -1087 -1061 -1052 -1109 -1101 -1098 




Table 7. Governance Effects on the Firm Next Year’s Cost of Capital in Industry Subsamples 
Notes: The table provides the results for the OLS, Tobit, and WLS regressions the cost of capital in the next year on governance variables, controls variables in different industries described in equation (2). The 
dependent variable is the weighted average cost of capital in the next year (WACC). The independent variables are same with table 5. T-values are reported below each of the coefficients in OLS and WLS, and Z 
values are reported below each of the coefficients in Tobit. *.**. *** indicates significance at the level of 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01. 
  OLS Regression Weighted Least Squares Tobit Model 
  Mining Manufacturing Transportation Mining Manufacturing Transportation Mining Manufacturing Transportation 
Intercept 18.479*** 4.813* 0.241 18.612*** 5.044* 4.32 18.479*** 4.813* 0.241 
  (3.37) (1.72) (0.08) (4.07) (1.91) (1.4) (3.49) (1.82) (0.08) 
Size 0.657 2.204*** -1.827*** 1.047** 1.962*** -1.844*** 0.657 2.204*** -1.827*** 
  (1.08) (5.98) (-3.05) (2.15) (5.38) (-3.6) (0.26) (6.34) (-3.25) 
CAPEX/TA 0.062** 0.008 -0.004 0.073*** 0.028 -0.01 0.062** 0.008 -0.004 
  (2.21) (0.2) (-0.1) (3.45) (0.7) (-0.33) (2.28) (0.21) (-0.11) 
Leverage -0.147*** -0.048*** -0.06*** -0.135*** -0.048*** -0.063*** -0.147*** -0.048*** -0.06*** 
  (-8.55) (-2.91) (-4.23) (-8.95) (-2.91) (-4.79) (-8.83) (-3.09) (-4.51) 
TAN/TA 0.002 0.063*** 0.036*** -0.001 0.052*** 0.019** 0.002 0.063*** 0.036*** 
  (0.05) (4.61) (3.88) (-0.02) (3.41) (2.63) (0.05) (4.41) (4.13) 
BM -0.67 0.345 0.396 -1.024** 0.332 -2.084** -0.67 0.345 0.396 
  (-1.27) (0.92) (0.49) (-2.45) (0.89) (-1.97) (-1.31) (0.98) (0.52) 
%Institution 0.003 0.003 0.039*** 0.013 0.002 0.044*** 0.003 0.003 0.039*** 
  (0.25) (0.4) (3.65) (1.39) (0.29) (4.2) (0.26) (0.42) (3.89) 
%Insider -0.125** -0.02 0.115* -0.103* -0.023** 0.112** -0.125** -0.02* 0.115* 
  (-2.15) (-1.57) (1.72) (-1.8) (-2.04) (2.1) (-2.23) (-1.67) (1.83) 
%Independent 0.03 0.02 0.022 0.012 0.026* 0.037** 0.03 0.02 0.022 
  (1.17) (1.22) (0.98) (0.55) (1.71) (2.09) (1.21) (1.3) (1.05) 
Log Board Size -3.206 -1.563 4.827** -2.771 -1.201 1.992 -3.21 -1.563 4.827** 
  (-1.2) (-0.71) (2.08) (-1.22) (-0.63) (1) (-1.25) (-0.75) (2.21) 
CEO Duality 2.008* -0.691 2.736*** 0.672 -0.496 1.829*** 2.008* -0.691 2.736*** 
  (1.78) (-0.82) (4.61) (0.48) (-0.63) (2.72) (1.84) (-0.87) (4.92) 
Adjusted R2 0.368 0.505 0.569 0.364 0.598 0.572    
Log Likelihood -423 -188 -171 -406 -183 -158 -423 -188 -171 





Table 8. Governance Effects on the Firm Contemporaneous Cost of Capital (Regional Dummies) 
Notes: The table provides the results for the OLS, Tobit, and WLS regressions of firm contemporaneous cost of capital on governance variables, controls variables, and regional dummy variables. The dependent 
variable is the contemporaneous weighted average cost of capital (WACC). The independent variables are same with table 5. The QC dummy denotes 1 if firm domiciled in Quebec, else 0. The ON dummy denotes 
1 if firm domiciled in Ontario, else 0. ). T-values are reported below each of the coefficients in OLS and WLS, and Z values are reported below each of the coefficients in Tobit. *.**. *** indicates significance at the 
level of 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01. 
  OLS Regression Weighted Least Squares Tobit Model 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Intercept 10.18*** 13.596*** 13.744*** 11.819*** 16.335*** 17.483*** 10.18*** 13.596*** 13.744*** 
  (11.5) (8.16) (8.09) (17) (12.52) (13.31) (11.64) (8.27) (8.21) 
Size 0.433** 1.105*** 0.97*** 0.361** 0.732*** 0.706*** 0.433** 1.105*** 0.97*** 
  (1.95) (4.15) (3.62) (2.07) (3.29) (3.62) (1.97) (4.2) (3.67) 
CAPEX/TA 0.075*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.059*** 0.056*** 0.054*** 0.075*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 
  (4.49) (3.91) (4.05) (3.71) (3.74) (3.66) (4.54) (3.96) (4.11) 
Leverage -0.11*** -0.11*** -0.11*** -0.09*** -0.098*** -0.091*** -0.11*** -0.11*** -0.11*** 
  (-14.53) (-15.3) (-14.35) (-13.33) (-15.43) (-14.56) (-14.71) (-15.5) (-14.55) 
TAN/TA 0.036*** 0.037*** 0.039*** 0.019*** 0.026*** 0.025*** 0.036*** 0.037*** 0.039*** 
  (5.46) (5.15) (5.39) (3.7) (5.46) (5.45) (5.52) (5.21) (5.46) 
BM 0.23 0.094 0.15 -0.154 -0.059 -0.064 0.23 0.094 0.15 
  (0.83) (0.33) (0.53) (-0.51) (-0.2) (-0.23) (0.84) (0.34) (0.54) 
%Institution 0.01**   0.01*** 0.011***   0.013*** 0.01**   0.01*** 
  (2.3)   (2.59) (2.65)   (3.29) (2.33)   (2.62) 
%Insider -0.03**   -0.029** -0.023***   -0.035*** -0.03**   -0.029** 
  (-2.12)   (-2.1) (-3)   (-6.03) (-2.14)   (-2.13) 
%Independent   0.013 0.003   -0.01 -0.017**   0.013 0.003 
    (1.18) (0.27)   (-1.22) (-2.1)   (1.2) (0.28) 
Log Board Size   -3.924*** -4.281***   -4.3*** -5.702***   -3.924*** -4.281*** 
    (-3.03)  (-3.33)   (-4.21) (-5.68)   (-3.07)  (-3.38) 
CEO Duality   0.27 0.34   0.384 0.392   0.27 0.34 
    (0.75) (0.93)   (1) (1.03)   (0.76) (0.94) 
QC Dummy -1.307*** -0.926*** -1.097*** -1.342*** -0.856*** -1.012*** -1.307*** -0.926*** -1.097*** 
  (-3.71) (-2.58) (-3.06) (-4.35) (-2.95) (-3.56) (-3.75) (-2.62) (-3.10) 
ON Dummy -0.662** -0.48 -0.553* -0.637*** -0.493** -0.52** -0.662** -0.48 -0.553* 
  (-2.2) (-1.58) (-1.83) (-2.6) (-2.1) (-2.37) (-2.23) (-1.6) (-1.85) 
Year-fixed-effects 
Effect 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.53 0.53 0.54 0.528 0.556 0.616    
Log Likelihood -1482 -1482 -1475 -1459 -1433 -1424 -1482 -1482 -1475 




Table 9. Governance Effects on the Firm Next Year’s Cost of Capital (Firm Fixed-Effects) 
Firm Fixed-Effects Regression 
 Dependent Variable: WACC 
 1 2 3 4 
Intercept 11.823*** 11.514*** 11.351*** 11.551*** 
  (8.64) (8.4) (4.44) (4.55) 
Size 0.659 0.528 0.611 0.486 
  (0.51) (0.41) (0.46) (0.37) 
CAPEX/TA 0.059*** 0.056*** 0.059*** 0.056*** 
  (3.07) (2.93) (3.01) (2.9) 
Leverage -0.066*** -0.068*** -0.066*** -0.069*** 
  (-4.4) (-4.59) (-4.38) (-4.59) 
TAN/TA -0.013 -0.0159 -0.014 -0.0162 
  (-0.7) (-0.85) (-0.72) (-0.86) 
BM -0.702** -1.031*** -0.706** -1.041*** 
  (-2.01) (-2.79) (-2.02) (-2.8) 
%Institution  0.026**  0.026** 
   (2.18)  (2.17) 
%Insider  -0.044*  -0.045* 
   (-1.73)  (-1.75) 
%Independent   -0.001 -0.007 
    (-0.04) (-0.31) 
Log Board Size   0.671 0.522 
    (0.3) (0.23) 
Adjusted R2 0.646 0.650 0.646 0.651 
N 121 121 121 121 
*.**. *** indicates significance at the level of 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01. 
Notes: The table provides the results for the firm fixed effects panel regressions of the cost of capital in next year on governance variables and 
controls described in equation (2). The dependent variable is the weighted average cost of capital in the next year (WACC). The independent 
variables are the natural logarithm of total assets (Size), the ratio of capital expenditures to total assets (CAPEX/TA), total liabilities over total 
assets (Leverage), tangible long term assets over total assets (TAN/TA), book value to market value ratio (BM), percentage ownership of 
institutional shareholders (%Institution), percentage ownership of insider shareholders (%Insider), proportion of directors who are independent 
directors (%Independent), the natural logarithm of director number (Log Board Size). T-values are reported below each of the coefficients. 
 
